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1. Stephanie Coontz, Op-Ed., Taking Marriage Private, N.Y. Times, Nov. 26, 2007, at
A23.
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increasingly begun to ask.2 But the fact that it was raised so publicly in a
year in which the nation celebrates the fortieth anniversary of the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia is nevertheless
striking. 3
Loving is a landmark decision and, significantly, one of the Court's most
important cases on matters of marriage. 4 It is the first Supreme Court case
to recognize that the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 And yet, perhaps curiously, the
Court never discussed the threshold issue whether it was appropriate for the
state of Virginia to play a role in deciding who could and could not marry.
Rather, the question Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed in his opinion for
the Court was whether Virginia, in enforcing its antimiscegenation laws,6
could deny permission to marry on the ground that the individuals
requesting it were of different races. 7 The basic legitimacy of the state's
role as the gatekeeper for marriage was a foregone conclusion.
2. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 Va. J. Soc. Pol'y & L. 239,
245 (2001) (reflecting on various meanings and constructions of civil marriage and arguing
that "for all relevant and appropriate societal purposes we do not need marriage, per se, at
all"); Charles J. Reid, Jr., And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in
Recognizing Marriage?, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. 1277 (2006) (considering the "privatization" of
marriage and the appropriate role of the state); Katharine B. Silbaugh, The Practice of
Marriage, 20 Wis. Women's L.J. 189 (2005) (criticizing, inter alia, the state's use of
marriage to control social issues); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-
All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1479 (2001) (calling for a laissez-faire
approach to marriage "privatization"); see also Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage:
A Revision, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 129, 142 (2003) (engaging calls to eliminate state-sponsored
marriage, but concluding that marriage best satisfies the need for regulation in our
"[i]ntimate lives"); Summer L. Nastich, Questioning the Marriage Assumptions: The
Justifications for "Opposite-Sex Only" Marriage as Support for the Abolition of Marriage,
21 Law & Ineq. 114 (2003) (exploring the redistribution of the legal benefits of marriage by
abolishing legal marriage).
3. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4. See R.A. Lenhardt, The Story of Perez v. Sharp: Forgotten Lessons on Race,
Marriage, and Family, in Race Law Stories 341, 341-42 (Devon W. Carbado & Rachel F.
Moran eds., 2008).
5. See id. at 365-66. Some scholars argue that, because of the dual grounds-race and
marriage-on which Loving was decided, the first clear articulation of the due process right
to marry did not come until Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978), which declared
unconstitutional a Wisconsin statute requiring any person with child-support obligations to
get court approval before being permitted to marry. See, e.g., Joseph A. Pull, Questioning the
Fundamental Right to Marry, 90 Marq. L. Rev. 21, 31 (2006).
6. At the time Loving was decided, Virginia had several statutes concerning
miscegenation. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 4-7. One of the statutes the Lovings were found to
have violated provided, in relevant part, that, "[i]f any white person intermarry with a
colored person, or any colored person intermarry with a white person, he shall be guilty of a
felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less than one nor
more than five years." Id. at 4. Significantly, this statute was only one of many Virginia had
enacted in its history. The first Virginia law banning interracial marriage was enacted in
1691. A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex
in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 Geo. L.J. 1967, 1967 n.5 (1989). Laws
prohibiting sexual intimacy between whites and blacks appeared in the American colonies as
early as 1662. Id. at 1968 n.6 (discussing the first prohibition on interracial sex).
7. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2.
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The Lovings, importantly, did not set out to change the way we think
about marriage and the state's role in it.8 The aim of these childhood
sweethearts-Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard
Loving, a white man-was actually much more modest.9 After years of
forced exile in Washington, D.C., for violating Virginia's prohibition on
interracial marriage,' 0 the Lovings wanted only to secure the right to live as
a married couple in their native state.II As Mildred explained years later,
"All we ever wanted was to get married, because we loved each other.
Some people will never change, but that's their problem, not mine. I
married the only man I had ever loved, and I'm happy for the time we had
8. See Robert A. Pratt, Crossing the Color Line: A Historical Assessment and Personal
Narrative of Loving v. Virginia, 41 How. L.J. 229, 231 (1998).
9. Mildred and Richard Loving grew up together in Central Point, Virginia, a
community whose racial norms were more relaxed than they were in other parts of the state.
Id. at 234. As Robert Pratt explained in his personal essay about the Loving case, interracial
intimacy was fairly common in Central Point, so much so that Mildred and Richard's
"budding romance drew little attention from either the white or the black communities" of
the town. Id. at 235.
10. The Lovings married in 1958 in neighboring Washington, D.C. Id. at 236. At that
time, the state of Virginia refused to recognize not only interracial marriages procured within
its borders, but also those outside of them. Id. When sheriffs' deputies, acting on an
anonymous tip, discovered the Lovings living as a married couple in the home of Mildred's
parents, they arrested them and charged them with violating the law. Id. Following grand
jury indictments for violation of the state's 1924 Racial Integrity Act, a judge sentenced both
Mildred and Richard to a year of imprisonment. Id. Their sentences, however, were
suspended "on the condition that they leave the state of Virginia and not return together or at
the same time for a period of twenty-five years." Id.
Significantly, the question of how a state should regard marriages procured outside its
borders that could not have been obtained within them has arisen again in the context of
efforts to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples. Many states, emboldened by the
federal Defense of Marriage Act passed by Congress in 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat.
2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C), have refused to recognize
marriages secured by gays and lesbians in jurisdictions within the United States, such as
Massachusetts, or in foreign countries. See Andrew Koppelman, Against Blanket Interstate
Nonrecognition of Same-Sex Marriage, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 205, 206 (2005) (noting
that "[florty states have laws on the books declaring that they will not recognize foreign
same-sex marriages"). New York, however, recently indicated that it would recognize such
marriages. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008) (holding
that a same-sex marriage obtained in Canada is entitled to recognition in New York); see
also Beth R. v. Donna M., No. 0350284/2007, 2008 WL 696441 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 25,
2008) (permitting a divorce action involving a same-sex marriage obtained in Canada). In
this sense, New York's approach is similar to that employed by California and other states
pre-Loving. See R.A. Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law,
and the Fight for Same-Sex Marriage, 96 Cal. L. Rev. (forthcoming Aug. 2008) (manuscript
at 101, 104-05, 104 n.19, on file with authors). Unlike Virginia, California, which also had
antimiscegenation laws on its books, determined that it would recognize interracial
marriages obtained in other states. Id. (manuscript at 104 n. 19); see also Pearson v. Pearson,
51 Cal. 120, 125 (1875) (holding that a marriage "valid by the law of the place where it was
contracted, is also valid in this State").
11. Richard Loving famously asked one of the attorneys who handled his case in the
Supreme Court to "[t]ell the Court I love my wife, and it is just unfair that I can't live with
her in Virginia." Pratt, supra note 8, at 239. For a discussion of this and other aspects of the
Loving narrative, see Peter Wallenstein, Tell the Court I Love My Wife: Race, Marriage,
and Law-An American History (2004).
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together. For me, that was enough."' 12 In the end, however, the impact of
the decision in Loving extended far beyond Mildred and Richard's
particular case.
Significantly, Loving received no mention in Professor Coontz's New
York Times editorial, which argued for the privatization of marriage. 13
While Coontz references the identity-based restrictions placed on marriage
over the years, 14 she bases her overall argument for relieving states of the
power they have long wielded in the marriage arena not on past abuses of
that power, but on the notion that society no longer benefits from
governmental regulation in this context. 15 The proof of this, Coontz
maintains, can be seen, in part, from the tremendous societal changes that
have occurred in traditional marriage over the last few decades. 16 Divorce
rates have skyrocketed since the 1950s and 1960s. 17 Many people never
marry at all.18 And those who choose to marry are doing so later and later
in life. 19 In short, as Professor Rachel Moran recently noted, marriage now
serves a very different purpose than it did in the past.20 It is no longer a
12. Pratt, supra note 8, at 244 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Coontz, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Rachel F. Moran, Loving and the Legacy of Unintended Consequences, 2007 Wis.
L. Rev. 239, 269. Some sources indicate that as many as fifty percent of marriages end in
divorce. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Prenuptial Agreements: A New Reason to Revive an Old
Rule, 53 Clev. St. L. Rev. 359, 372-73, 373 nn.67-68 (2005) (citing various sources,
including U.S. Census data, in supporting the fifty percent claim); see also U.S. Census
Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2008 (2008) (indicating that the divorce
rate in the 1980s fell from that in the 1970s, falling to 3.6 divorces per thousand from 5.3 per
thousand).
18. See Moran, supra note 17, at 269. Nationally, from 1970 to 2006, there was an
eighty-seven percent increase in the number of men who never married and an eighty-three
percent increase in the number of women who never married. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table
MS-i: Marital Status of the Population 15 Years Old and Over, by Sex and Race: 1950 to
Present (2007), available at http://ww.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/msl.xls; see
also R. Richard Banks & Su Jin Gatlin, African American Intimacy: The Racial Gap in
Marriage, 11 Mich. J. Race & L. 115, 119, 124 (2005) (finding that "[b]lack women now
marry at a lower rate than any other group of women," and noting a similar decline for black
men); Cynthia Grant Bowman, Social Science and Legal Policy: The Case of Heterosexual
Cohabitants, 9 J.L. Fam. Stud. 1, 7-9 (2007) ("Some commentators have concluded that
cohabitation has substituted for the lost or postponed marriages .... ); Ira Mark Ellman,
Divorce Rates, Marriage Rates, and the Problematic Persistence of Traditional Marital
Roles, 34 Fam. L.Q. 1, 17-21 (2000) (discussing the decline in marriage rates in the context
of women's marital preferences).
19. See Moran, supra note 17, at 274. Nationally, the estimated median age at first
marriage rose from 23.2 for men in 1970 to 27.5 in 2006. See U.S. Census Bureau, Table
MS-2: Estimated Median Age at First Marriage, by Sex: 1890 to the Present (2007),
available at http://www.census.gov/population/sacdemo/hh-fam/ms2.xis. At the same time,
the median age for women rose from 20.8 to 25.5. Id.; see also Claudia Goldin, The Long
Road to the Fast Track: Career and Family, 596 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 20
(2004) (tracing the rise in age at first marriage among college-educated women).
20. See Moran, supra note 17, at 268-69.
2672 [Vol. 76
INTRODUCTION
prerequisite for cohabitation or sexual intimacy.21 Nor is a marriage license
necessary to raise children. 22 Despite the New York Court of Appeals 2006
decision in Hernandez v. Robles, which regarded heterosexual marriage as a
virtual precondition for the rearing of well-adjusted children, 23 the reality is
that, today, "[a]lmost 40 percent of America's children are born to
unmarried parents." 24
The significance of these and other similar changes cannot be ignored.
As Coontz maintains, they reflect tremendous shifts in the nature of the
personal and intimate obligations individuals-gay, straight, bisexual, or
transgendered-now have to one another.25 Marriage in the twenty-first
century is arguably very different from what Mildred and Richard Loving
had in mind.26 There is good reason to explore this reality and to engage
questions about the proper place of marriage in contemporary society, given
the evolution we have witnessed in an institution that the Supreme Court
has described as "the most important relation in life" 27 and "an association
that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects . . . an
association for as noble a purpose as any .... -28 It may be, as Coontz and
other scholars, including some in this book,29 have suggested, that
marriage's elevated status in the hierarchy of models for human intimacy
and obligation has been undermined by the shifts in societal norms that
have occurred. We submit, however, that it would be futile to try to
comprehend fully the significance of the societal changes that have
21. Moran, supra note 17, at 269; Coontz, supra note 1. Along these lines, we no longer
stigmatize children born outside of marriage as illegitimate. See Thomas Healy, Stigmatic
Harm and Standing, 92 Iowa L. Rev. 417, 479 (2007) (arguing that the "stigma of
illegitimacy has lessened somewhat over time, as the number of illegitimate births has
increased and as alternative models of the family have become more accepted"); Linda C.
McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 Hastings L.J. 339, 350 (1996) (critiquing
rhetoric decrying "the decline in stigma attached to out-of-wedlock births"); see also Gomez
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 537-38 (1973) (holding that state denial of public benefits to
illegitimate children violates the equal protection guarantee).
22. See Moran, supra note 17, at 269.
23. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 2006).
24. Coontz, supra note 1. Based on 2005 data, the percentage of out-of-wedlock births
is 36.8 nationally. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 17; see also Bowman, supra note 18,
at 31-34 (distinguishing between children in single-parent households and those in
cohabitation households, and noting that half of the latter are biological children of both
cohabitants).
25. Coontz, supra note 1.
26. Moran, supra note 17, at 268-69.
27. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
28. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also, e.g., Skinner v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (describing marriage as
"fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390, 399 (1923) (describing a due process right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children").
29. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Loving Before and After the Law, 76 Fordham L. Rev.
2821 (2008); see also Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2685
(2008) (contesting the centrality of marriage in claims for gay rights and advocating an
increased focus on other models for human intimacy and obligation).
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occurred since the 1960s and 1970s in the area of marriage without also
considering Loving and the impact of the Supreme Court's opinion in that
case. A full determination of where we are with marriage and "loving"
cannot be made in the absence of a more complete understanding of Loving.
Our insistence on placing Loving at the center of any attempt to
comprehend contemporary marital and intimate relations may be
counterintuitive to some. After all, we noted at the outset that Loving did
not purport fundamentally to change marriage or the role of the state in
regulating it. At the same time, it seems clear that in spite of this and the
modest aims of the Loving plaintiffs, the decision in Loving has been
transformative on a number of levels. 30 Indeed, in recent years, it has been
at the forefront of efforts to rethink marriage, the nature of the obligations it
imposes, and the role of the state in determining which relationships are
licit and which are illicit. One need only look at recent litigation to secure
rights for same-sex couples to get some sense of this. Loving has been a
centerpiece of litigation efforts waged by advocates for the right of gay and
lesbian couples to marry.3' Even more significantly, it figured prominently
in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's 2003 decision in Goodridge
v. Department of Public Health, which extended marriage rights to gay and
lesbian couples in Massachusetts. 32 As the following excerpt highlights,
30. Loving has led to changes in cross-racial intimacy. See Randall Kennedy, How Are
We Doing with Loving?: Race, Law, and Intermarriage, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 815, 817-19
(1997) (describing, inter alia, Loving as a "triumph" for freedom of choice); Pratt, supra note
8, 240 (describing the decision's effect on Mildred and Richard Loving personally); Tim
Padgett & Frank Sikora, Color-Blind Love: Once Considered Taboo, Interracial Marriages
Are Now on the Rise-Even in Some Unexpected Places, Time, May 12, 2003 (unpaginated)
(claiming a 1000% increase in the number of interracial marriages since Loving and profiling
several such couples in Alabama). But its greatest impact may be on thinking about race,
marriage, and the law. See John DeWitt Gregory & Joanna L. Grossman, The Legacy of
Loving, 51 How. L.J. 15, 52 (2007) (noting that Loving's legacy has mostly been legal, not
cultural, since interracial marriage is still a "relatively unusual occurrence"); see also
Reginald Oh, Regulating White Desire, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 463, 508-11 (discussing the
impact of Loving on the legality of racial subordination). But see Rashmi Goel, From
Tainted to Sainted: The View of Interracial Relations as Cultural Evangelism, 2007 Wis. L.
Rev. 489 (cautioning that Loving failed to address the racist "cognitive imprint" that favors
the white partner in an interracial relationship); Camille A. Nelson, Lovin' the Man:
Examining the Legal Nexus of Irony, Hypocrisy, and Curiosity, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 543
(same, from Nelson's own personal perspective).
31. Loving has been cited and is often discussed at length in major case filings submitted
by advocates for the right of same-sex couples to marry. See, e.g., Respondents' Opening
Brief on the Merits, In re Marriage Cases, 149 P.3d 737 (Cal. 2006) (No. A110451);
Memorandum of Authorities in Support of All Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
and In Support of All Plaintiffs' Resistance to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment,
Varnum v. Brien, No. CV5965 (Iowa Dist. Ct. Jan. 30, 2007); Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SJC-08860); Brief of
Appellants, Lewis v. Harris, 908 A.2d 196 (N.J. 2006) (No. 58398); Brief for Plaintiff-
Appellants, Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006) (No. 103434/04); Appellants'
Brief, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-32); Corrected Brief of Respondents,
Andersen v. King County, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) (No. 75934-1).
32. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 969.
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the Goodridge court relied a great deal on Loving and Perez v. Sharp,33 the
first post-Reconstruction case to invalidate an antimiscegenation law 34 :
As both Perez and Loving make clear, the right to marry means little if it
does not include the right to marry the person of one's choice, subject to
appropriate government restrictions in the interests of public health,
safety, and welfare.... In this case, as in Perez and Loving, a statute
deprives individuals of access to an institution of fundamental legal,
personal, and social significance-the institution of marriage-because of
a single trait: skin color in Perez and Loving, sexual orientation here. As
it did in Perez and Loving, history must yield to a more fully developed
understanding of the invidious quality of the discrimination.
3 5
Our objective in planning this fortieth celebration of Loving was to
devise a program that would allow us to explore in depth the modem
implications of the Court's 1967 decision in Loving-what it says about the
state's role in intimate relationships, as well as what it might explain about
race, family, and the place of marriage in modem society. Too often, the
inclination among scholars is to choose between the different aspects of
Warren's opinion for the Court. 36 On the one hand, there are Warren's
statements about race and the dangers of racial prejudice. The assertion that
"the racial classifications [in Virginia's antimiscegenation statute] must
stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy," 37 is viewed as a "key sentence" in Loving,38 one absolutely
critical to understanding both issues of race and equality, and the concerns
of the Court during this period. 39  On the other hand, there is the
aforementioned language about marriage. Warren's conclusion that
"[mlarriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very
existence and survival," was extremely significant,40 both because of what
33. 198 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1948). For more on Perez v. Sharp and its utilization in recent
marriage cases, see Lenhardt, supra note 10.
34. See, e.g., Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958-59.
35. Id. at 958 (citation omitted).
36. Cf Lenhardt, supra note 10 (manuscript at 126).
37. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
38. Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 Ind. L.J. 1, 17 (1994)
("The key sentence in Loving says that 'the racial classifications [at issue] must stand on
their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy." (alterations in
original) (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)).
39. See id. at 17-18 ("The striking reference to White Supremacy-by a unanimous
Court, capitalizing both words and speaking in these terms for the only time in the nation's
history-was designed to get at the core of Virginia's argument that discrimination on the
basis of participation in mixed marriages was not discrimination on the basis of race. The
Supreme Court appeared to be making the following argument: Even though the ban on
racial marriage treats blacks and whites alike-even though there is formal equality-the
ban is transparently an effort to keep the races separate and, by so doing, to maintain the
form and the conception of racial difference that are indispensable to White Supremacy.");
see also Christopher A. Bracey, Dignity in Race Jurisprudence, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 669,
713 & n. 198 (2005); Richard Delgado, The Current Landscape of Race: Old Targets, New
Opportunities, 104 Mich. L. Rev. 1269, 1280 n.49 (2006); John A. Powell, Whites Will Be
Whites: The Failure to Interrogate Racial Privilege, 34 U.S.F. L. Rev. 419, 463 (2000).
40. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
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it said about what was at stake for the Lovings and what it signaled about
the status of marriage in the constitutional hierarchy. 4
1
Rather than choose between these two poles, we have preferred to think
of them, as the Loving Court arguably did, as interdependent, each
necessary to comprehend the issues at hand.42 As the essays by Angela
Harris and Kevin Noble Maillard in this book help to elucidate, state laws
pertaining to marriage and sexual intimacy have been instrumental in
promoting racial segregation and stratification and, more generally, in
constructing racial identity. 43  Nothing illustrates this better than the
opinion of the Virginia trial court in Loving, which regarded the state's
antimiscegenation laws as essential to restoring what it perceived as the
racial order originally established by "Almighty God [with] white, black,
yellow, malay and red [persons] ... on separate continents." 44 Likewise, as
Erica Chito Childs's and Russell Robinson's essays emphasize, race, or
more specifically the racial identity of one's intimate partner, still plays a
critical role in shaping how individuals think about sexual intimacy and the
prospect of marrying someone of a different race. 45 Indeed, although the
rates of interracial marriage have increased since 1967,46 they have not
done so to the extent one might expect.47 Interracial sexual intimacy may
41. Lenhardt, supra note 10 (manuscript at 126-28).
42. On the importance of considering both aspects of the Loving decision, see William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Destabilizing Due Process and Evolutive Equal Protection, 47 UCLA L.
Rev. 1183, 1186-87 (2000); Lenhardt, supra note 10 (manuscript at 126-28, 152-61);
Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Fundamental Right" That Dare Not Speak Its
Name, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1893 (2004).
43. See Kevin Noble Maillard, The Multiracial Epiphany of Loving, 76 Fordham L. Rev.
2709 (2008); Erica Chito Childs, Listening to the Interracial Canary: Contemporary Views
on Interracial Relationships Among Blacks and Whites, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2771 (2008).
For a fuller discussion of the role of marriage laws in constructing racial and gender identity,
see Randall Kennedy, Interracial Intimacies: Sex, Marriage, Identity, and Adoption (2003);
Rachel F. Moran, Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance (2001); and
Lenhardt, supra note 10 (manuscript at 128-41).
44. Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court concluded
that "[t]he fact that [God] separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to
mix." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45. Chito Childs, supra note 43; Russell K. Robinson, Structural Dimensions of
Romantic Preferences, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2787 (2008).
46. Maillard, supra note 43, at 2710. The U.S. Census Bureau reports that, in 1960, only
0.4% of all marriages were interracial, including interracial couples that were not black-
white. U.S. Census Bureau, Table 1: Race of Wife by Race of Husband: 1960, 1970, 1980,
1991, and 1992 (1998), available at
http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/race/interractabl .txt. By 1970, that figure rose
to 0.7%. Id. The figures were 1.3% in 1980, 1.8% in 1990, 2.6% in 2000, and 3.8% in 2006.
See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 17; see also Padgett & Sikora, supra note 30 (claiming a
1000% increase in interracial marriages between 1967 and 2003).
47. See Kennedy, supra note 43, at 127; Gregory & Grossman, supra note 30, at 48-51
("[A] significant proportion of the population prefers to date people of the same race"); see
also Rachel F. Moran, The Mixed Promise of Multiracialism, 17 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 47,
49 (2001) (noting "[d]isparities in intermarriage patterns" such as "93% of interracial
marriages involving an Asian, Latino, or Native American were to white partners"); R.
Richard Banks, The Aftermath of Loving v. Virginia: Sex Asymmetry in African American
Intermarriage, 2007 Wis. L. Rev. 533, 535 (recognizing that black women are less likely
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occur, but for many people, the idea of entering into a lifelong partnership
with someone of a different race is still simply unimaginable. 48
The dual dimensions of Warren's opinion are also a lens on matters
beyond those formally addressed in the opinion-concerns that Warren and
his colleagues on the Court probably never contemplated but that are
nevertheless implicated by the Court's decision.49 For example, what can
Loving be understood to say about same-sex couples seeking to marry,
particularly in light of the Supreme Court's 2003 decision in Lawrence v.
Texas,50 which held that state laws criminalizing same-sex intimacy
deprived gays and lesbians of the liberty interests secured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 5 1 Is there a meaningful
analogy between identity-based restrictions on marriage that concern race
and those that pertain to gender or sexual orientation? 52 Does it make sense
for marriage to be so much at the center of the movement for LGBT
than black men to enter into interracial marriages); Banks & Gatlin, supra note 18, at 130-31
(finding that African Americans as a whole are less likely than Latinos or Asian-Americans
to intermarry).
48. See Chito Childs, supra note 43; see also Juliet A. Cox, Comment, Judicial
Enforcement of Moral Imperatives: Is the Best Interest of the Child Being Sacrificed to
Maintain Societal Homogeneity?, 59 Mo. L. Rev. 775, 785 (1994) (noting a 1991 poll in
which forty-five percent of white respondents disapproved of interracial marriage); Angela
Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 873, 891-92 (2006) (discussing, inter
alia, responses to interracial relationships).
49. See Moran, supra note 17, at 264.
50. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
51. See Cass. R. Sunstein, Liberty After Lawrence, 65 Ohio St. L.J. 1059 (2004); Tribe,
supra note 42, at 1945-51 (discussing Lawrence and marriage for gay and lesbian couples).
52. The debate over whether a meaningful analogy can be drawn between the race and
same-sex marriage contexts has been waged in law reviews for many years now. See
Lenhardt, supra note 10 (manuscript at 107 n.36, 128-31) (citing various law review
articles). Many scholars maintain the analogy works. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Equality Practice: Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 Alb. L. Rev.
853 (2001); Randall Kennedy, Marriage and the Struggle for Gay, Lesbian, and Black
Liberation, 2005 Utah L. Rev. 781, 783-84; Andrew Koppelman, The Miscegenation
Analogy: Sodomy Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 Yale L.J. 145 (1988); Adele M. Morrison,
Same-Sex Loving: Subverting White Supremacy Through Same-Sex Marriage, 13 Mich. J.
Race & L. 177 (2007); Josephine Ross, The Sexualization of Difference: A Comparison of
Mixed-Race and Same-Gender Marriage, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 255 (2002); Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and "Passing": Race and Sexual
Orientation, 13 Harv. BlackLetter L.J. 65 (1997); Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and
the Constitution: On the Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 981 (1991).
Other scholars have raised concerns about deploying the analogy. See Lenhardt, supra note
10 (manuscript at 128-31). For example, some have expressed concern that it distorts the
holding of Loving and other similar cases. See, e.g., Monte Neil Stewart & William C.
Duncan, Marriage and the Betrayal of Perez and Loving, 2005 BYU L. Rev. 555. Others
have argued that the analogy masks problems of race and hierarchy within the gay and
lesbian community, among other things. See Devon W. Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights,
Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. Rev. 1467, 1484-1500 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out
Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian Legal Theory and Political Discourse,
29 Conn. L. Rev. 561, 631-35 (1997).
20081 2677
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
rights? 53  Can access to marriage for same-sex couples "deliver" on
citizenship and the benefits it confers in the way that it arguably did for
African Americans? 54 In addition, one might contemplate the reverberating
effects of Loving for other kinds of intimate associations and their place in
American society and law. 55 What of the relationship between a parent and
child?56 Or the relationship between extended family members or even
friends? 57 Does Loving offer a way of thinking about these types of
interpersonal relationships? Does it tell us something about handling
matters of identity that might arise within them?
Finally, looking beyond the particular facts of Loving invites an inquiry
into the treatment of matters of race and marriage outside the borders of the
United States. Have other countries managed to construct a model of state
regulation of marriage that is different than what we have seen in the United
53. See Franke, supra note 29, at 2685-87; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of
Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 Colum. J. Gender & L. 236 (2006). We use the term
"LGBT" to refer to lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgendered individuals.
54. Numerous scholars have discussed the denial of marriage rights of same-sex couples
as a citizenship issue. See, e.g., Amy L. Brandzel, Queering Citizenship?: Same-Sex
Marriage and the State, II GLQ 171, 195 (2005); Harris, supra note 29; Lenhardt, supra
note 10 (manuscript at 107, 108, 151-61). Katherine Franke has explained elsewhere that
"[tihe right to marry [also] figured prominently among the bundle of rights African
Americans," who had lacked the capacity to marry as slaves, "held dear in the postbellum
years." Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of African
American Marriages, 11 Yale J.L. & Human. 251, 252 (1999). At the same time, Franke,
expressing caution about the move toward marriage among gays and lesbians, has
emphasized that marriage also served as an avenue for state intervention in the intimate
relations of freedmen and women. Id. at 252-53.
55. Scholars have engaged in a wide-ranging discussion about alternatives to marriage
and the possibilities for other models of human intimacy, connection, and obligation. See
generally Nancy D. Polikoff, Beyond (Straight and Gay) Marriage: Valuing All Families
Under the Law (2008) (challenging the use of marriage as a mechanism for providing
numerous public and private benefits); Bowman, supra note 18 (recommending reforms in
recognition of the prevalence of cohabitation); Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry
Me, Bill: Should Cohabitation Be the (Legal) Default Option?, 64 La. L. Rev. 403 (2004)
(discussing the feasibility of cohabitation as an alternative to legal marriage); Marsha
Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the Emerging Law of Cohabitant
Obligation, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 815 (2005) (same); Linda C. McClain, Intimate Affiliation and
Democracy: Beyond Marriage?, 32 Hofstra L. Rev. 379 (2003) (discussing alternative
kinship forms); Nastich, supra note 2; Allen M. Parkman, The Contractual Alternative to
Marriage, 32 N. Ky. L. Rev. 125 (2005) (discussing potential alternatives to civil marriage);
Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. Rev. 189 (2007) (advocating
legal recognition of friendship and family care-taking arrangements); Stark, supra note 2;
Daniel I. Weiner, The Uncertain Future of Marriage and the Alternatives, 16 UCLA
Women's L.J. 97 (2007) (discussing proposed alternatives to legal marriage).
56. See, e.g., Richard Banks, The Color of Desire: Fulfilling Adoptive Parents' Racial
Preferences Through Discriminatory State Action, 107 Yale L.J. 875 (1998) (discussing
cross-racial adoption); Elizabeth Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation,
107 Yale L.J. 2351 (1998) (responding to Banks, supra).
57. Laura Rosenbury discussed the stance the law should take with respect to friendship
and the recognition of extramarital care-taking arrangements in a recent article. See
generally Rosenbury, supra note 55 (advocating the legal recognition of friendship and
family care-taking arrangements).
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States? 58 If, as the Lawrence Court suggested, it is reasonable and even
desirable to permit the practices of other nations with respect to same-sex
intimacy to inform constitutional decision making on such matters in this
country,59 might we, for example, look to what other countries have done in
thinking about the legitimacy of state laws that exclude same-sex couples
from the institution of marriage? 60 Could the experience of South Africa or
Canada be instructive? 61
In a very real sense, our goal in organizing the Forty Years of Loving:
Confronting Issues of Race, Sexuality, and Family Symposium was to
examine the Loving decision in all of its dimensions and to look at all the
dimensions of "loving." Admittedly, this agenda was more than a little
ambitious. But, as this book attests, we were able, through the incredible
contributions of the Symposium participants and attendees, to achieve a
good part of our goal. On November 2, 2007, scores of legal and nonlegal
scholars, practitioners, and students filled the auditorium at Fordham
University School of Law to give Loving what, at this point in its forty-year
existence, may be the very best celebration we could offer: a thorough and
in-depth discussion of what it has meant and can mean to those concerned
about matters of race, sexuality, and family in modern society.
Each of the four sessions held during the Symposium focused on an
important aspect of Loving and/or loving. The panelists in our opening
session, Historical Perspectives on Race, Sex, and Family, endeavored to
put in context the Loving decision and questions regarding the identity-
based restrictions that states have historically placed on marriage. Professor
Maillard, addressing questions of race and collective memory, challenged
us to reject the vision of Loving as "Multiracial Epiphany," the idea that it
somehow began or made possible the formation of interracial relationships
or the existence of mixed race individuals. 62  Through a compelling
discussion of three "contemporary disputes over racial identity and
membership" 63-that concerning Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemmings,
one of his former slaves, and those claiming to be their descendants; that
58. For a survey of developments in marriage in other countries, see, for example, M.V.
Lee Badgett, Predicting Partnership Rights: Applying the European Experience to the
United States, 17 Yale J.L. & Feminism 71 (2005); and Mark E. Wojcik, The Wedding Bells
Heard Around the World: Years from Now, Will We Wonder Why We Worried About Same-
Sex Marriage?, 24 N. I11. U. L. Rev. 589, 603-76 (2004).
59. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003) (discussing the treatment of
homosexual intimacy in European countries).
60. For a discussion of Lawrence and its global implications, see Sonia K. Katyal,
Sexuality and Sovereignty: The Global Limits and Possibilities of Lawrence, 14 Wm. &
Mary Bill Rts. J. 1429 (2006).
61. See Anjuli Willis McReynolds, What International Experience Can Tell U.S. Courts
About Same-Sex Marriage, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 1073 (2006) (suggesting that the experiences
of other countries can support claims for same-sex marriage in the United States). To date,
Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, South Africa, and Spain have recognized same-sex
marriages. See Bruce M. Wilson, Claiming Individual Rights Through a Constitutional
Court: The Example of Gays in Costa Rica, 5 Int'l J. Const. L. 242, 253 n.71 (2007).
62. Maillard, supra note 43, at 2711.
63. Id. at 2712.
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involving Essie Mae Washington-Williams, a woman of color who recently
revealed that she was the daughter of former Senator Strom Thurmond,
once an avowed segregationist; and that pertaining to descendants of West
Ford, a slave said to be the son of George Washington and a slave named
Venus-Maillard's essay in this book both documents the existence of
interracial intimacy that occurred long before Loving and focuses our
attention on the continued resistance to interracial relationships and the
inability of some to acknowledge a pre-1967 past that includes them.
Professors Katherine Franke and Darren Hutchinson turned our attention
to recent litigation to secure marriage equality for LGBT couples, each
effectively arguing that "there are good reasons to resist the analogy to
Loving."64 Concerned that the current focus on marriage will ultimately
require the "surrender of a great deal of the liberty rights acknowledged in
Lawrence"65 as well as gay and lesbian acquiescence in intimate lives
patterned exclusively on heterosexual relationships,66 Franke's essay urges
advocates to undertake "efforts to secure marriage equality for same-sex
couples... in a way that is compatible with efforts to dislodge marriage
from its normatively superior status as compared with other forms of human
attachment, commitment, and desire." 67 In this connection, she proposes
friendship as an alternative model for reconceptualizing social structures,
one that does not implicitly use marriage as the ultimate measure of human
intimacy and commitment, and that would not, in her estimation, result in
increased regulation of gay and lesbian sexual liberty.68 In Franke's view,
friendship has the advantage of "destabiliz[ing] the meanings and the
makings of meaning of fundamental human life," 69 of letting individuals
decide for themselves how to interact, and what their commitments and
obligations to one another should be. 70
The panelists in the second session, Social and Legal Norms Regarding
Race, Sex, and Gender Nonconformity, built on the tremendous foundation
laid by the first panel in diverse and innovative ways. Professor Carlos Ball
continued the focus on current marriage litigation, broadening the
discussion to concentrate not only on the arguments made by gay advocates
of equal access to marriage, but also those advanced by state officials and
judicial officers. In particular, Ball's essay critiques the emphasis on child
rearing in judicial opinions upholding as constitutional bans on marriage for
same-sex couples, demonstrating that similar arguments were made in
defense of antimiscegenation laws such as those struck down by Loving.
64. Franke, supra note 29, at 2685.
65. Id. at 2688.
66. Id. at 2697-98 (critiquing the default rule under the American Law Institute
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution that treats relationships where the individuals
have jointly maintained a household and cohabited for a specific period of time as
presumptive domestic partnerships).
67. Id. at 2686.
68. Id. at 2702-05.
69. Id. at 2704.
70. Id. at 2705.
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The remaining panelists in this session shifted the conversation away
from litigation matters and toward an exploration of modem examples of
interracial "loving." Professor Adrienne Davis addressed matters of race
and gender underlying the film Monster's Ball, critiquing the storyline for
its adherence to flawed conceptions of both race and gender in interracial
relationships. Professor Chito Childs, for her part, looked more broadly at
the attitudes of Whites and Blacks toward interracial marriage in the
twenty-first century. Arguing that black-white relationships function as a
"miner's canary ... expos[ing] lingering racism, prejudice, and segregation
in society," 71 Chito Childs's fascinating essay provides the results of
qualitative interviews on cross-racial intimacy and explores the "dominant"
and sometimes shocking "images and beliefs about black-white couplings"
and what they suggest about the state of "contemporary race relations."
72
Professor Robinson invited the audience to think harder about results
such as these by drawing attention to the "impact of structural conditions on
preferences regarding intimacy." 73  In an essay that blends personal
narrative and empirical analysis, Robinson explores the impact of racial
screening devices such as Internet dating sites and sex-segregated queer
social spaces. He concludes that these and other social structuring devices
greatly influence romantic preferences, giving special attention to black-
white intimate interactions involving gay men.
74
Professor Harris of the University of California-Berkeley School of Law
was magnificent as the conference's keynote speaker. A distinguished
scholar, and leader in Critical Race Theory, Critical Race Feminism, and
LatCrit, Harris delivered an address that both synthesized themes raised in
the prior two sessions and compelled the audience and participants to travel
to entirely new intellectual territory. In Loving Before and After the Law,
Harris considers "marriage as a practice of national citizenship," 75 focusing
specifically on notions of citizenship that bear on the "possession and
enjoyment of certain political, civil, and social rights"76 and "active
engagement in the public life of the community." 77 In Harris's view, "the
legacy of Loving v. Virginia looks strikingly different depending on which
[of these] ax[e]s of citizenship one chooses to examine." 78  From the
perspective of rights, Harris-who develops a theory of state power
71. Chito Childs, supra note 43, at 2784.
72. Id. at 2774.
73. Robinson, supra note 45, at 2787.
74. Id.
75. Harris, supra note 29, at 2821.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2822.
78. Id. at 2823. Citing the work of Professor Linda Bosniak, Professor Harris
acknowledges that there are additional dimensions of citizenships that marriage implicates,
but which she chose not to explore in her keynote address. For a discussion of the
dimensions of citizenship generally, see Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 Ind. J.
Global Legal Stud. 447, 455 (2000); and Leti Volpp, "Obnoxious to Their Very Nature":
Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship, 8 Asian L.J. 71, 71-72 (2001).
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premised on "racialized gender" 79 and the preparation of "proper" citizens
through marriage 80 -argues that Loving should be read to require gay and
lesbian access to marriage, "not because marriage holds any special position
in human life," 81 but because "the denial of the right ... signals that state
power is being used to enact a system of caste." 82 From the perspective of
participation, however, Harris contends that Loving may very well be
irrelevant, to the extent it emphasizes the citizenship-building capacity of
marriage, an institution that, as Coontz emphasizes, is in serious decline in
the United States. In concluding, Harris points us toward alternatives for
possible reconciliation of these divergent views. Apart from the options
presented by various forms of political theater, such as queers marrying en
masse and "heterosexuals ... refus[ing] to get married," she emphasizes the
new and productive avenues that might be opened by a critical examination
of prevailing conceptions of family.83
Finally, our last session of the day-a panel entitled Transnational
Perspectives on Race, Sex, and Family-followed the path blazed by Harris
in the previous session, turning the focus to the international context and an
inquiry into how other countries have handled their own Loving moments,
instances when they have been confronted with diverse claims for racial,
gender, sexual, or familial diversity. As with the prior sessions, the
panelists provided in-depth and thought-provoking analyses of the
conference themes and issues. Professor Chandan Reddy delivered remarks
that considered the challenges for LGBT organizing in the domestic and
international contexts, advocating the adoption of a new paradigm for queer
political engagement. His essay in this book picks up on that theme by
exploring the limits of legal efforts to secure marriage rights and equal
citizenship for gay men and lesbians. More specifically, Reddy asks what
gay advocates gain and lose by invoking Loving in current marriage
litigation. 84 Engaging critical texts relevant to his query, Reddy accuses
advocates of living too much in the past and relying on the social
hierarchies and structure that constituted it, concluding that the use of
Loving and the move toward "the universalization of the right to marriage"
it reflects "is the very means by which the law forecloses other, possibly
more difficult and imaginative articulations of antiracism." 85 In his view,
"the desire for the universal right of marriage is primarily the preservation
of an episteme that has lived beyond its utility. '86
79. Harris, supra note 29, 2824-26.
80. Id. at 2829.
81. Id. at 2846.
82. Id. For a discussion of the benefits denied same-sex couples by the bar of marriage
rights, see Elizabeth B. Cooper, Who Needs Marriage?: Equality and the Role of the State, 8
J.L. & Faro. Stud. 325 (2006).
83. Harris, supra note 29, at 2846-47.
84. Chandan Reddy, Time for Rights? Loving, Gay Marriage, and the Limits of Legal
Justice, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2849 (2008).
85. Id. at 2871.
86. Id.
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Professor David Eng addressed similar issues in his presentation,
advancing a critique of what he refers to as queer liberalism. He focused
primarily on the implications of regarding the Court's 2003 decision in
Lawrence as one that concerns gay rights alone. Reminding us that
Lawrence involved a couple that was gay as well as interracial, Eng urged a
more sustained focus on intersectionality and the ways in which legal
restrictions in the area of intimacy can have effects on matters of race and
sexuality. For Eng, the success of queer liberalism-which so often entails
an embrace of Loving, as Goodridge and other recent marriage cases
attest-should not rest on what amounts to a "forgetting of race."
Professors Adrien Wing and Darren Rosenblum took the conversation in
a different, but equally productive direction by considering the identity-
related implications of international laws and policies bearing on questions
of race and gender. Darren Rosenblum focused on Norway, comparing
judicial efforts to achieve racial equality in Loving with efforts by the
legislature of Norway to secure a level of gender equality for women
through the implementation of the Corporate Board Quota (CBQ). In his
essay, Rosenblum urges a renewed focus on the possibilities presented by
"assertive remedies for inequality" such as quotas. He argues that, in the
final analysis, Norway's QBC has been more effective than Title IX and
other similar measures in the United States for achieving equity through
forms of balancing. In this connection, Rosenblum, while praising the
outcome of Loving, concludes that, as a necessarily passive remedy, it is
inherently limited in its ability to facilitate interracial intimate relationships.
Employing themes from Critical Race Feminism, as well as personal
experience and narrative, Professor Adrien Wing closed the session and the
Symposium by asking how Loving can help us think about the challenges
faced by "Muslim women who.., want the legal freedom to marry outside
their faith," something forbidden in most Muslim countries. 87 Her essay in
this book, Twenty-First-Century Loving: Nationality, Gender, and Religion
in the Muslim World, explores the multiple race, gender, and family-based
identities possessed by Muslim women and discusses in detail the
challenges they face both under Islamic family law precepts subordinating
women to men and in the secular world, where head scarves and other
indicia of spiritual devotion mark Muslim women as targets for abuse and
discrimination. Explaining that these forces combine to make life
extremely difficult for Muslim women who want to enter into interfaith
unions, Professor Wing urges a focus on the many ways in which "[g]ender
discrimination manifests itself."'88 And she offers specific solutions for
addressing the inequities posed by interfaith marriage bans that range from
public education to legal strategies centered on gender equality provisions
contained in the constitutions of countries in the Muslim world and
international provisions, such as the International Covenant on Civil and
87. Adrien Katherine Wing, Twenty-First-Century Loving: Nationality, Gender, and
Religion in the Muslim World, 76 Fordham L. Rev. 2895, 2896 (2008).
88. Id. at 2905.
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Political Rights,89 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, 90 and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women. 91 While acknowledging that barriers to
interfaith marriage are unlikely to rank high on the international human
rights agenda in the near future, Professor Wing, referring to Loving and the
presidential candidacy of Senator Barack Obama-who is the product of a
union that was both interracial and interfaith-reminds us that there are
good reasons to expect and hope for productive change down the road.
Together, the talented group of scholars who participated in Forty Years
of Loving: Confronting Issues of Race, Sexuality, and the Family in the
Twenty-first Century managed to make important interventions in the field
that will significantly advance thinking about Loving in the context of the
intersecting realities of race, sexuality, and family in contemporary
American society. No doubt some will find that there are questions and
issues relevant to understanding Loving that were not addressed by this
Symposium or that were explored only superficially. This gathering of
scholars was not, however, meant in any way to close the book on Loving-
to somehow wrap up neatly a case that, as the discussion above details,
touches on some of the most difficult and complex issues facing our
society. Like the Lovings, our aim here was ultimately more modest. In
the end, we wanted simply to launch a critical conversation about the
Court's decision in Loving, one that perhaps complicates as many issues as
it resolves. In opening up the discussion, we invite others to join in what
we expect will be a conversation that continues for at least another forty
years.
89. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368.
90. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
91. Covention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
openedfor signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
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